Is the national security apparatus dependency on digital computer representation of combat (military operations) warranted and healthy? Whatever happened to analysis and real data?
Digital computer models (code) of combat (military operations) cannot be validated.
Reasons:
1. Early research (circa 1954-1960) on the mechanisms of combat: to wit, interactions on the battlefield; the influences of human behavior on combat (including command and control); synergism among weapons, people and the environment, was never completed. Digital computer seduction of analysts started in the 1960s, following publication of Dick Zimmerman's paper in 1956--the paper that initiated Monte Carlo modeling of combat--with the introduction of the transistor as substitute for the vacuum tube. Computer programming (preparation of code) became simpler; programs could be larger; run times were reduced; and computer reliability increased.
The fact that the necessary solid research was never completed (partially because of the seduction of the machine) means that the underlying structure to support digital computer modeling remains a mystery. [Recall the "base of sand" controversy; I think Paul Davis & the others at RAND were right.]
2. By analogy, models of complex phenomena (phenomena which are unpredictable and not subject to conventional statistical analysis dealing with uncertainty, that is chaotic and non-linear phenomena) cannot be validated. The best one can hope for is to have a model that represents someone's view of a piece of reality. [I'm not really sure of this, even.] Recent evidence strongly suggests that models of relatively stable and simple physical phenomena (e.g., ground water seepage, soil contamination, low-level cloud physics), not influenced by human behavior and decisions, defy validation.
What are the implications for institutions (military analysis, testing, and acquisition) of a structure (hierarchy, set) of models that cannot be validated?
UNOFFICIAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR: Gene Visco bulks large in the arena of military analysis, both by reputation and physique. For many years he has been the U.S. Army Sponsor's Representative to the Military Operations Research Society (MORS). He is a MORS Fellow (or phellow in MORS-speak). His pithy remarks are received with reverence. Lately, he has been riding a hobby horse -- he seems to think that analysts should analyze!